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Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal 
allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with 
private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, 
however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner 
solutions, in which some agents choose zero flat contributions, normally avoid underprovision 
and illustrate and interpret our results by a simple numerical example. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well-known that public good provision is inefficiently low in the voluntary contribution 
model (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler 1996). The use of “matching mechanisms”, under which 
the contributions of independently acting agents are subsidized by others, has been suggested 
as a way to achieve efficiency.
1 Ideally, such mechanisms implement a Pareto optimal solu-
tion as a Nash equilibrium.  
     A matching mechanism works as intended if all agents equate their marginal rates of subs-
titution between the public and the private good with their individual price ratios as modified 
by matching. Unfortunately, under any given matching scheme, such interior matching equili-
bria only emerge for specific initial income distributions. Interiority of Nash equilibria is even 
much harder to get with matching than without (see Buchholz, Cornes and Rübbelke 2011). 
Rather, corner solutions  involving zero flat contributions by some players  are a likely out-
come of voluntary public good provision with matching.
2 This is bad news concerning the 
usefulness of matching mechanisms. Better news, however, is that for matching schemes that 
would lead to Pareto optimality in an interior equilibrium underprovision of the public good 
will be avoided even if a corner solution occurs in which all agents still have strictly positive 
private consumption and thus is non-degenerate. To demonstrate this striking result we use 
the Aggregative Game Approach (see Cornes and Hartley 2007). 
In addition to our formal analysis, we construct a si mple numerical 2-agent example, in 
which we use the Kolm triangle (see Kolm 1969, Chapter 9), to illustrate our claims. In addi-
tion to the “Pareto optimal” matching mechanism, which is treated in our general analysis, the 
example also considers the standard voluntary contribution and a “partial” matching mechan-
ism. The comparison between the outcomes under these mechanisms further elucidates the 
source of our overprovision result.   
    
                                                 
1 The long list of papers dealing with matching in a public good economy includes Guttman (1978), Boadway, 
Pestieau and Wildasin (1989), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), Althammer and Buchholz (1993), Varian (1994), 
Andreoni  and  Bergstrom  (1996),  Falkinger  (1996),  Kirchsteiger  and  Puppe  (1997),  Falkinger  and  Brunner 
(1999), and Boadway, Song and Tremblay (2007). Several authors – e.g. Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996) – 
have proposed matching in the context of global climate policy. 
2 On the importance of corner solutions in volu ntary public good provision games without matching see 
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), Itaya, de Meza and Myles (1997) and Cornes and Sandler (2000).   2 
2. The Framework 
There are n agents  1,..., in   with utility functions  ( , ) ii u x G  where  i x  is private consumption 
of agent i and G  is public good supply. All utility functions are twice partially differentiable, 
strictly monotone increasing in both variables and strictly quasi-concave. Indifference curves 
are assumed to asymptote to the two axes. Both goods are strictly normal for every agent 














 , where  i i i z w x   is agent i´s total contribution to the 
public good which, under a given matching scheme, consists of a direct flat contribution  i y , 
chosen independently of the actions of the other agents, and of an indirect contribution that 
agent i makes by matching the flat contributions  j y  of all other agents. Neither component of 
an agent‟s total contribution can be negative. For a linear matching scheme as considered in 
this paper we have  







 .  
Here for  ji   the exogenously given and constant matching rates  0 ij    express how much 
agent i adds to the flat contributions of agent j and where  1 ii   . Given a matching scheme 
agent  ´ is marginal rate of transformation between the private and the public good is  








The reciprocal, 1/ i   thus is the subsidized personal public good price agent i has to pay for 
an additional unit of the public good. 
Given any linear matching scheme, preferences and income, a Nash equilibrium is defined in 
the usual way. 
Definition: An n-tuple  1 ( ,..., )
MM
n yy  is a matching equilibrium in flat contributions if for any 
agent  1,..., in   the flat contribution 
M
i y  maximizes  
(3)                                        
11
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where 
M
i G  denotes aggregate public good supply of all agents  ji  .   3 
A matching equilibrium is called interior if all flat contributions are strictly positive, i.e. 
0
M
i y   for all  1,..., in  . Furthermore, let public good supply in a matching equilibrium be 
M G  and private consumption of agent i be .
M
i x   
     To apply the Aggregative Game Approach, let  (.)
i
i e
 denote agent  ´ is income  expansion 
path, described as a function of public-good supply G , on which agent  ´ is marginal rate of 
substitution between the private and the public good equals  i  . Given strict normality for both 
the private and the public good, the function  (.)
i
i e
  is defined for all  0 G   and is strictly in-
creasing in G  with  (0) 0
i
i e
   for all agents  1,..., in  . We now compare the levels of public 
good supply that result in different matching equilibria.  
 
3.  Public Good Supply in Interior and in Corner Solutions  
Let  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , ) n x x G  denote the levels of private consumption and the level of public good supply 
in an interior matching equilibrium given a certain matching mechanism, individual prefer-
ences and some distribution of total income W . Then we have 
(4)                                 ˆ ˆ ()
i
ii x e G
             for all  1,..., in          and 
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     Condition (4) holds since any agent that chooses a strictly positive flat contribution is in a 
position in which her marginal rate of substitution equals  i  , so that her choice is on the in-
come expansion path  (.)
i
i e
 . Condition (5), the aggregate budget constraint, holds since each 
agent spends her income either for private consumption or her contribution to the public good. 
A given matching mechanism, given preferences and any given level of aggregate wealth 
0 W  , generate unique values  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , ) n x x G  that fulfil conditions (4) and (5). This  follows 
from strict monotonicity of all income expansion paths  (.) i
i e
 , and  (0) 0
i
i e
   for all agents i.  
     If we apply some matching mechanism and start from some arbitrary distribution of in-
come it is, however, an unlikely eventuality that an interior matching equilibrium really re-
sults. Rather, without adjusting the matching mechanism to the income distribution which is 
informationally quite demanding, we have to face corner matching solutions, in which the flat 
contribution of at least one agent is zero (see Buchholz, Cornes and Rübbelke 2011). For cor-  4 
ner solutions that in addition are non-degenerate in the sense that  0
M
i x   for  1,..., in   it is 
now possible to compare public good supply 
M G  with public good supply  ˆ G  in an interior 
solution.  
Proposition  1:  If  1 ( ,..., , )
M M M
n x x G  is  a  non-degenerate  corner  matching  equilibrium,  then 
ˆ M GG   holds.  
Proof: At a non-degenerate matching equilibrium,  ()
i MM
ii x e G
   for all agents i that make 
strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. But, for any agent whose flat contribu-
tion is zero,  ()
i MM
ii x e G
  . Otherwise the marginal rate of substitution between the private 
and the public good would be smaller than  i   and there would be an incentive for her to make 
a positive contribution to the public good. Now assume that  ˆ M GG  . From strict monotonic-
ity of all income expansion paths it then follows that  
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Hence  the  aggregate  resource  constraint  would  not  hold,  which  gives  a  contradiction.                                                                                 
                      QED 
 
Proposition 1 implies that public good supply in a matching equilibrium is smallest when the 
number of active contributors is highest, i.e. if all agents in the economy make a strictly posi-
tive  contribution  to  the  public  good.
3 The argument  given in the proof also  implies that if 
some agent  j  is not at the verge of contributing in  1 ( ,..., , )
M M M
n x x G , i.e.  ()
i MM
ji x e G
   holds, 
we even get  ˆ M GG  .  
     Turning to matching schemes which seek to implement a Pareto optimal allocation it di-
rectly follows from the Samuelson rule that an interior matching equilibrium is Pareto optimal 
if and only if  





i i  
  .  
                                                 
3 Letting  0 ij    for all ij  , the result in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), that compares the levels of 
public  good  supply  in  interior  and  in  corner  solutions  of  the  standard  voluntary  contribution  game  without 
matching, is obtained as a special case of Proposition 1.   5 
A matching mechanism that fulfils condition (7) is called a Pareto matching scheme. We have 
the following result. 
Proposition  2:  If  1 ( ,..., , )
M M M
n x x G  is  a  non-degenerate  matching  equilibrium  given  some 
Pareto matching scheme, then there is a Pareto optimal allocation with public good supply 
* M GG  . 
Proof:  Choose 
* ˆ : GG   when  ˆ G  again is the public good supply in the interior matching 
equilibrium of the given scheme. Proposition 2 then is an immediate implication of Proposi-
tion 1.                                                                                                                            
QED                                                                                                                      
 
Proposition 2 says that applying a matching mechanism helps in any case to avoid underpro-
vision  of  the  public  good.  If  the  desired  Pareto  optimal  interior  matching  equilibrium  is 
missed and a corner solution is attained, then the public good will, in a sense, be overprovided 
as long as the outcome is non-degenerate. Our overprovision result is particularly striking 
when optimal public-good provision is independent of income distribution, as is the case un-
der Bergstrom-Cornes preferences (see Bergstrom and Cornes 1983).  
     Note, however, that Proposition 2 does not hold for degenerate matching equilibria. For 
example, suppose that three agents  1,2,3 i   all have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function 
( , ) i i i u x G xG  .  The  matching  scheme  is  given  by  12 21 0   ,  13 23 1    and 
31 32 2   . Obviously, if  1 2 3 3       , then condition (7) is fulfilled and the interior 
matching equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Let  12 10 ww  and  3 4 w  . Then the Pareto opti-
mal public good provision is 
* 12 G  . It can readily be confirmed that the matching equilib-
rium is given by  12 8
M M M x x G     and  3 0
M x  , i.e. the matching equilibrium is degenerate 
and in contrast to the result in Proposition 2, public good underprovision arises.  
  
4.    A Numerical Example 
In this section, we exploit the Kolm triangle to work through three different matching rules 
within the context of a simple numerical 2-person example. This diagram, although unable to 
cope with more than two agents, has the advantage that, within this limitation, it can show 
every magnitude of interest. We refer the reader to the paper by Thomson (1999) for an excel-
lent explanation of the diagram, and for demonstrating a number of its applications. An earlier   6 
paper by Schlesinger (1989), unfortunately not widely available, gives a clear account of the 
voluntary contribution mechanism in such an economy.
4    
Consider an economy with 2 agents, one pure public good and one private good   -  in short, 
the standard 2-agent public good economy. Our example  supposes that the two agents have 
identical Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
                         
Budget constraints are 
                       
Finally, we set total income at 12 units: 
              
    We do not at this stage pin down the precise distribution of initial income. We will see as 
we go along how different income distributions give rise to different outcomes. The reader 
should think of the large equilateral triangle in Figures 1-3 as having height 12, reflecting the 
total endowment of the economy. Each of the smaller triangles that make up the grid has 
height 1 unit. 
 
4.1 Preparation: The Kolm Triangle Method 
 The key idea underlying the Kolm diagram is the following. Any point in the equilateral tri-
angle represents the trio of values          . Given the point E, say, in Figure 1, the value of 
   is measured by the length of the perpendicular from E to AB, that of    by the perpendicu-
lar from E to AC, and that of G by the perpendicular from E to BC. Thus, given that the 
height  of  each  small  triangle  is  taken  to  be  one,  the  point  E  represents  the  allocation 
                   . The point I represents the allocation                     - and so on. 
The fact that the sum of these three perpendiculars is a constant reflects the fact that the sum 
of the three economic quantities equals the given overall resource endowment:              
            . 
Our example is a member of the class, identified by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983), with a 
unique optimal level of public good provision, regardless of the distribution of private good 
consumption. Straightforward calculation of the Samuelson rule for optimal provision identi-
fies the optimal level as G
PO = 6. In each figure the horizontal dashed line along which G = 6 
represents the set of Pareto optimal allocations. 
                                                 
4 In view of the difficulty of obtaining Schlesinger‟s contribution, we explain the depiction of the voluntary 
mechanism by the Kolm triangle in some detail, before going on to the partial and “Pareto optimal” matching 
mechanisms.   7 
4.2 Equilibrium of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism [             ]  
At an interior equilibrium - that is, an equilibrium at which every agent chooses an interior 
allocation - each agent equates her marginal rate of substitution between private and public 
good with the relative price that she faces. In the present example this implies that: 
 
          




                 
 
Before we identify an equilibrium, consider first agent 1's behavior. Whatever her endow-
ment, the sacrifice of one unit of private good increases the total quantity available of the pub-
lic good. For example, if w1 = 5, and the other agent's contribution to the public good is zero, 
agent 1 can transform private into public good at the rate of one-for-one along the ray ID in 
Figure 1.  
w1 w2
neutrality













Figure 1: The voluntary contribution mechanism [             ] 
 
Her most preferred choice is  the point of tangency with  an indifference curve, D, where 




  . Now vary agent 2's contribution parametrically. As agent 2's contribution 
increases, agent 1's endowment point shifts upward along IF. Thus her implied transformation   8 
curve shifts upwards to the right. The implied locus of tangencies between the transformation 
curves and her indifference map, her „income expansion path‟, is the ray BH. 
5 
If both agents are to be choosing an interior solution, then the allo cation must be at the sole 
intersection of the income expansion paths at E, where G = 4. This will, indeed, be the equili-
brium under the present mechanism arising from any initial income distribution within the 
indicated neutrality zone in Figure 1 in which 
                      
For example, suppose that                . This is the point I. The points E and I can be 
seen as opposite corners of a parallelogram, ENIM, whose sides have the slopes of the agents' 
transformation curves. At E, the agents' contributions are                . Agent 2's contri-
bution implies that agent 1 has a full income represented by the point N - she has 5 units of 
money income plus 3 units of public good. Given her implied full income endowment point, 
N, her utility-maximizing choice is clearly to give up one unit of the private good and aug-
ment the public good total by one unit, taking her to E. Similarly, agent 1's contribution of one 
unit implies that agent 2 enjoys a full income represented by the point M. Again, it is clear 
that her best choice is to move along her transformation curve to her point of tangency at E. 
Consider the thick continuous lines through E, the slopes of which equal those of the two 
agents' transformation curves. Their points of intersection with the base of the triangle identi-
fy the limits of the neutrality zone, within which income distributions generate the equili-
brium at E. 
    Now suppose that the initial distribution of income is outside the neutrality zone, say at the 
point J where                 . Starting from this point, agent 1 will sacrifice 5 units of 
private good consumption to contribute 5 units of the public good, taking her to the point K. 
Agent 2 will contribute zero. She would like to be able to undo a part of agent 1's contribu-
tion, but the nonnegativity constraint on contributions rules this out. Thus the equilibrium is at 
the point K, where                    . 
 In short, the locus of equilibrium outcomes is the piecewise linear curve GEH. All initial 
distributions within the neutrality zone map into the equilibrium E. As agent 1's initial income 
                                                 
5 If agent 1's income, w1, is fixed at 5, not all points on this expansion path can be attained. The constrained 
income expansion path starts at the point D - points on the segment BD will never be observed under the present 
mechanism. Furthermore, if agent 2 contributes 5 or more units to the public good, agent 1 will not be on her 
expansion path, since this would involve her making a negative contribution to the public good - something we 
do not allow. Hence, in this case, points on the segment KH will not be observed. These observations simply 
reflect the fact that the tangency condition only characterizes interior solutions for agent 1. 
   9 
increases further beyond the point where       , the equilibrium level of public good provi-
sion rises. Indeed, as        , the equilibrium provision gets closer to the unique Pareto op-
timal level that we identified at the outset. The same observations apply if the income distri-
bution is sufficiently skewed in favour of agent 2 to take us outside the neutrality zone to the 
left in Figure 1. 
 
4.3 Equilibrium with [Weak] Matching:                    
We retain all features of the numerical example, except that we now suppose there is strictly 
positive matching. Specifically, suppose that 
 
 
       
       
           
     
   
 
In this case, agent i's utility is 
 
            
  
             
  
                    . 
 
Inspection of the arguments of this function shows the implied trade-off between private good 
consumption and the total level of public good as agent i varies her choice of yi. By giving up 
a unit of private good consumption, agent i augments public good provision by 
 
   units. Of 
this, she herself contributes one unit. In addition, the other agent is bound by the matching 
rule to contribute half a unit. 
At any internal allocation, agent i equates her private marginal rate of transformation to her 
marginal rate of substitution. Figure 2 depicts the expansion paths for the two agents.  
Whatever her initial endowment point, agent 1's transformation curve is steeper than under 
zero matching. As a consequence, the locus of tangencies between transformation and indiffe-
rence curves, which is agent 1's income expansion path, is the ray BH′. This ray is steeper 
than its counterpart in Figure 1. Since the same observations apply also to agent 2, the com-
mon intersection between the two expansion paths, BH′and CG′- which is the Nash equi-
librium under this mechanism - is at E′in Figure 2, where =              
  
   
  
   
  
   .   10 
w1 w2
neutrality












Figure 2: The weak matching mechanism                   
 
Again, the allocation E′will only be achieved if the initial income distribution is such that 
both agents are at an interior solution. Since each agent's transformation curve is steeper than 
in Figure 1 - reflecting the more favorable rate at which each can transform her private good 
into public good through the matching rule - the set of distributions consistent with interior 
solutions is smaller than under the standard zero matching mechanism. In Figure 2, the end-
points of this set of distributions are where the rays E′N′ and E′M′ intersect the base of 
the triangle. 
Outside the neutrality zone, the larger the positive contributor's income, the larger is the 
equilibrium public good level. For example, if                 - the point J′ in Figure 2 - 
agent 1 will choose a flat contribution rate of       . Under the matching rule, this requires 
agent 2 to make a matching contribution of 2 units, even if the latter chooses a flat rate of 
       -  which  she  will  do  at  equilibrium.  The  equilibrium  quantities  are            
       .  Note  that  this  particular  equilibrium  implies  precisely  the  unique  Pareto  optimal 
quantity of the public good. If the income distribution were even more unequal, the resulting 
equilibrium would imply an even higher level of public good provision, as agent 1 chooses 
higher points on her expansion path, forcing matching contributions from agent 2. 
   11 
4.4  Equilibrium  with  “Pareto” Matching  [             ]To give an illustration of our 
genera analysis in Section 3 we now consider, as a final step, a specific Pareto matching 
scheme which  This matching scheme is given by  
 
 
       
       
        
   
  
 
In this case, agent i's utility at any allocation is 
 
                                              
 
This is the matching scheme which, under ideal circumstances, produces an efficient Lindahl 
equilibrium. For each agent, the sacrifice of one unit of private consumption generates 2 units 
of additional public good. However, the set of income distributions that lead to an equilibrium 
in which both agents are at an interior solution has shrunk yet further by comparison with the 
partial matching mechanism. Indeed, the alert reader can perhaps anticipate the outcome un-
der this matching rule. 
In Figure 3, which depicts this case, the parallelogram to which we drew attention in our 
discussion of the zero and partial matching rules has degenerated to a line, so that the neutral-
ity zone has shrunk to a singleton. Each agent, in return for sacrificing one unit of the private 
good, gains 2 units of public good. Of this, one unit is the matching contribution by the other 
agent. The equilibrium reached from the single income distribution consistent with interior 
outcomes, E  , is the point of common tangency between the transformation curves and the 
agents' indifference curves.  
It is therefore clearly Pareto optimal. All other possible equilibria, reached from other in-
come distributions, involve levels of G that are „too high‟. For example, starting from a distri-





    . The implied value of G exceeds the unique Pareto optimal level of 7. By choosing 
    
 
 , agent 1 forces a matching contribution of 
 
  from agent 2, who chooses       , in 
equilibrium.   12 
w1 w2
neutrality









Figure 3: The Pareto matching mechanism [             ] 
 
Since the equilibrium attained when                 implies the unique Pareto optimal level 
of public good provision, it clearly follows that the further the income distribution departs 
from equality in either direction, the more will the resulting equilibrium level of the public 
good exceed its unique optimal level, as the higher income agent forces matching contribu-
tions out of the other. The locus of equilibria under this matching rule is the piecewise linear 
curve G  E  H  . 
 
4.5 Lessons of the Numerical Example 
Our  example  is,  of  course,  very  simple  and  special  since,  e.g.,  preferences  are  of  the 
Bergstrom-Cornes type which gives independence of the Pareto optimal level of public good 
from the distribution of private consumption.  But some properties of the example are robust 
and significant. 
First, under each of the three mechanisms, it is the normality assumption that is responsible 
for the fact that, as the income of the set of positive contributors increases, so too does the 
equilibrium level of public good provision. Second, any increase in the extent to which play-
ers‟ flat contributions are matched by others increases the absolute value of the slope of the 
agent‟s transformation curves in the Kolm triangle. This feature by itself shrinks the set of 
initial income distributions that constitute what we have called the neutrality zone – so much   13 
so that, under full matching, this set becomes a singleton. These two observations show that it 
is not so surprising that the Pareto matching mechanism never generates a level of public 
good provision that is below the level in a Pareto optimal solution.  
In particular, income distributions  that imply a nonempty set  of noncontributors  yield a 
higher level of public good provision than that achieved at the interior equilibrium, i.e. over-
provision of the public good results. At such corner equilibria, those who choose positive flat 
contributions are forcing others, even those who choose zero flat contributions, to sacrifice 
private consumption by making matching contributions. In a certain sense thus negative ex-
ternalities are being generated by those who choose positive flat contributions. 
We have noted, without further exploring, the possibility of degenerate equilibria at which 
the private consumption of some agents is driven to zero by the matching requirement. It is 
easily confirmed that, in our example of the Pareto optimal matching mechanism depicted in 
Figure 3, if       , the equilibrium level of public good provision falls as income distribution 
becomes more unequal. Moreover, if       , it will fall below its Pareto optimal level. Such 
allocations would not satisfy participation constraints, since agent 2 would be better off. In 
our example, this requires very unequal income distributions. It may be interesting to explore 
modified matching rules that respect voluntary participation requirements, and also to analyze 
matching rules that permit individual agents to opt out. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In a public good economy the use of matching mechanisms is attractive because in principle 
they may generate Pareto optimal allocations as the outcome of a voluntary provision game. 
However, there is the significant problem that, without exact knowledge of individual prefe-
rences, there is much risk that a corner matching equilibrium instead of the desired interior 
solution is attained. But the deviation from Pareto optimal public good supply as associated 
with non-degenerate corner solutions entails throughout an overprovision of the public good. 
This result, which is the main message of this paper and has been illustrated and interpreted 
through a simple numerical example, may sound reassuring to all those who perceive under-
provision of essential public goods (as in the sphere of global public goods, e.g., greenhouse 
gas abatement) as the most important danger. 
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